I Introduction
One of the most significant areas of security and international law is that of threats to the security of individuals. As this book deals elsewhere with the concept of 'human security', this chapter is dedicated to one particular conception of how to address the threats to individual security posed by mass atrocity crimes -the doctrine of 'Responsibility to Protect'
(RtP). RtP was born in 2001
1 with the publication of a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 2 aimed at being a comprehensive doctrine capable of overcoming the deadlock between state sovereignty/non-intervention and human rights, which had characterised the humanitarian intervention debate in previous decades, due to its broader understanding of security crises. consensus between states and also areas where issues are clearly unresolved and lacking international consensus on human protection.
This chapter addresses some of these issues by exploring the role of the RtP doctrine in providing security to vulnerable individuals. It does so in the light of the book's two main questions -whether international law can address the types of security risks that threaten our existence in the 21st Century and where and how international law might fall short in meeting the problems that arise in situations of insecurity. To answer these questions, the chapter critically engages with RtP, examining how it constructs the nature of insecurity and what assumptions are made about the role of international law in providing security. Section II introduces the idea of 'responsibility to protect' and its development. Section III examines some key assumptions underpinning RtP. The first assumption is the very foundation of RtPthat the internal crises in which mass atrocity crimes occur are the key threat to individual security today. The second assumption is that because these crises are associated with weak, failing or non-democratic regimes, domestic governance reform is the most important crisisprevention strategy. The third assumption is that, given that the fault lies with the government that has failed to protect its people, the international community's role is to respond by rescuing those at risk, should prevention fail. Section IV argues that these assumptions provide an incomplete picture of the situations of insecurity in which mass atrocity crimes occur and, thus, give a faulty analysis of suitable prevention measures. It criticises RtP's assumptions for neglecting more chronic socio-economic problems, related to violence and insecurity, and consequent mass abuses of civil and political rights. Related to this implicit decoupling of socio-economic from civil and political rights, this section also argues that RtP insufficiently addresses the role of the international community in actually contributing to the sorts of crises that RtP attempts to address. Section V considers the place of RtP in international law and relates arguments about RtP to those concerning international law's 'fitness for purpose' in addressing security threats in the 21st Century more generally. Some concluding thoughts are then offered. 
II

A The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001
The 2001 ICISS report was commissioned by the Canadian Government to find a way forward from the state sovereignty-human rights deadlock, which had characterised the earlier humanitarian intervention debate.
7
Having met with a wide range of actors, including NGOs, governments and civil society groups, the Commission produced a detailed report covering the changing international context of security threats; changes in the terms of the humanitarian intervention debate and the meaning of sovereignty; the three 'pillars' of responsibility (to prevent, to react and to rebuild); together with operational issues relating to military intervention, including the question of Security Council authority. Finally, the report ended with thoughts for the 'way forward' from the analysis therein to action in the future. In this context, the report notes that a principle is emerging of intervention for human protection purposes -including military intervention in extreme cases of major harm to civilians.
11
In light of this, the Commission recommended changing the terms of the debate from a 'right to intervene' to a 'responsibility to protect', focusing on the victims rather than the interveners and encompassing a broader responsibility than just that of military intervention.
12
The core principle of the report is that '[w]here a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to halt or avert it, the principle of nonintervention yields to the international responsibility to protect'.
13
The ICISS report did not receive an immediate response from the international community, but was debated four years later by the General Assembly as part of its World Summit.
B The United Nations General Assembly World Summit 2005
In two paragraphs of its 'Outcome Document', the General Assembly endorsed the key principle of RtP in its 2005 World Summit.
14 Paragraph 138 of the Outcome Document refers to states' responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and encourages the international community to assist states in exercising this responsibility.
15
Paragraph 139 acknowledges the responsibility of the international community to help protect populations against these crimes. It notes that this 9 See ICISS (n 2) 4. 10 ICISS (n 2) 6 para 1.25, 14. 11 ICISS (n 2) 16 para 2.25. 12 ICISS (n 2) 17, para 2.29; G Evans, 'Responsibility to Protect: an idea whose time has come...and gone?' (2008) 22 Intl Relations 283. 13 ICISS (n 2) xi. 14 UNGA, Outcome Document (n 4). 15 UNGA, Outcome Document (n 4) para 138. responsibility is to be carried out peacefully in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter or, if necessary, by acting collectively through the Security Council and Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis, where a state is 'manifestly failing' in its protective duty. It also recommends that the General Assembly continue to consider the responsibility to protect populations, 'bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law'.
16
Although this has been hailed as a revolutionary norm,
17
the Outcome Document is a somewhat cautious approach to the detailed content of the full ICISS report, such as in its reference to the option of General Assembly-mandated action,
18
or to the suggestion made by 'a senior representative of one of the Permanent Five countries' that the Security Council's 'P5' might refrain from using their veto power.
19
Nevertheless, it seems that the idea of both states and the international community having a responsibility towards individuals at risk from mass atrocities has been accepted by the General Assembly, which instructed Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to continue to report on the matter.
C Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 2009
One of the results of the General Assembly's request to the Secretary General was the report 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', produced in 2009. 20 The report suggests a threepillar strategy for implementing the responsibility to protect (different from the pillars in the 2001 report of prevention, reaction and rebuilding). to the state's 'manifest failure' to protect its population.
35
The ICISS report notes that millions are at risk of atrocities and RtP is designed to deliver 'practical protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect them'.
36
This role of the state towards its own citizens is reflected in pillar 1 of the 2009 report, which notes that 'it is the enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations ... from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement'.
37
RtP is thus designed to be a narrow doctrine, addressing only these mass atrocity crimes and the local government's role in carrying them out or in failing to prevent them.
38
The doctrine is also designed to be 'deep' because, although the focus of RtP claims to be on prevention, flexible responses to crises also involve a 'wide array of protection and prevention instruments' from Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter.
39
RtP's definition of insecurity relates specifically to threats from (or failures of) the citizens' own government in relation to the civil and political rights of the state's own citizens (limited to the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing). Again, clearly, the very existence of the doctrine assumes that something can be done about mass atrocity crimes specifically, with RtP specifying that it is Chapter VI, VII and VIII measures that are appropriate. This is discussed further in the next subsection on the causes of crises.
A The cause of threats to individual security
Perhaps unsurprisingly for a report that deals with grave civil and political rights abuses, the 2001 ICISS report relates the primary causes of conflicts or state collapse to failures in 35 UNGA, Outcome Document (n 4) para 139. 36 ICISS (n 2) 11 para 2.1. 37 Ki-moon (n 5) 8 para 11.a. domestic governance -in particular, commenting that a 'firm national commitment to ensuring fair treatment and fair opportunities for all citizens provides a solid basis for conflict prevention'.
40
The 2009 report comments that populations will be at risk if 'national political leadership is weak, divided or uncertain about how to proceed' (for example, against rebels).
41
It also deplores the lack of education and training on human rights in states at risk from RtP crimes.
42
Mass atrocity crimes are therefore taken to be caused by the government responsible for the civil and political rights of its citizens.
43
Mass atrocities being the fault of the government, RtP then considers the role of the international community in response to national governance failures. It is to this that the next section turns.
B The international community's role in enabling security i Prevention and Assistance
The international community's secondary responsibility to protect populations at risk from mass atrocity crimes involves helping states prevent crimes on their territory and responding to the commission of such crimes should preventive efforts fail. RtP recommends that the international community help local efforts to identify triggers of conflict 44 
IV Security and Responsibility: an alternative conception
This section will address RtP's construction of the nature of security threats by suggesting an alternative understanding of these threats. It critiques the very need for a doctrine focused on mass atrocity crimes because such a doctrine inevitably assumes that the 'international community' is well-placed to rescue people from this particular type of insecurity, rather than having a role in creating systemic causes of insecurity. The alternative conception of insecurity offered below links socio-economic development to security more explicitly than RtP does, arguing that, without adequately addressing this issue (and the international community's role in contributing to the causes of insecurity), the international community can only ever respond to the symptoms, and not the causes, of insecurity.
A The Importance of Mass Atrocity Crimes
This section contends that, while horrific, mass atrocity crimes are not necessarily the primary insecurity faced by vulnerable populations today. Creating a doctrine to enable urgent responses to these particular crimes elevates the importance of certain types of death over other types, without justification, and risks adding to the injustices suffered by the most vulnerable people by drawing attention away from equally important, and related, situations of insecurity. Some statistics highlight this point. There are 18 million poverty-related deaths annually, with 2,000 million people lacking access to basic drugs, 2,500 million lacking access to basic sanitation, 1,020 million chronically undernourished and 34 million people suffering from HIV and AIDS.
56
This contrasts with the 1998 statistics of 588,000 deaths from war and 736,000 from social violence 57 and, of course, the famous death toll numbers of 800,000 in Rwanda and suggestions of 100,000 in Syria. Alex Bellamy describes this issue as 'structural violence', rather than organised military violence, being the main contemporary problem facing humanity.
58
In this regard, he contrasts 'death by politics' (state sponsored killing) with 'death by economics' (such as starvation). The latter is somehow seen as being outside the interest or responsibility of international law and the 'international community.
59
The perception of mass atrocity crimes as the most urgent security issue reflects a tendency of international lawyers to focus on crises, rather than on systemic chronic issues, and thus not consider the relationship between the two. As Hilary Charlesworth notes, 'using crises as our focus means that what we generally take for 'fundamental' questions and enquiries are very restricted'. dying from poverty-related causes. The existence of a doctrine addressing mass atrocities also suggests that they are a separate act or acts, unrelated to other global problems. This does not enable a comprehensive understanding of the situations in which mass violence occurs.
Proponents such as Adama Dieng (the Secretary General's Special Representative for the Prevention of Genocide) argue that RtP is supposed to be a narrow doctrine and so benefits from this limited focus.
62
Gareth Evans (one of ICISS' co-chairs) describes this as limiting the doctrine to 'extreme, conscience-shocking cases'. 
67
Teson asserts that anarchy and tyranny (non-democracy) are the worst forms of injustice because it is in these conditions that evils, such as genocide, are perpetrated.
68
In addition, John Rawls' theory of justice focuses more on the civil and political arena than socio-economic issues -equality of civil and political opportunities can never be compromised and increased socio-economic equality is not a justification for civil and political inequalities.
69
In a similar vein, RtP relates insecurity strictly to the government's failure to protect its people's civil and political rights. it then ties these causes back to the civil and political rights arena of national democratic participation and national responsibility, suggesting that national poverty and inequality is to be solved by national good governance.
72
Very little of the 2001 report considers the potential 'direct' responsibility of the international community for socioeconomic underdevelopment in poorer countries (rather than viewing national political constitution as responsible for socio-economic development).
73
The 2009 report is slightly more promising in this regard, referring to aid and development as part of conflict prevention in stronger terms than ICISS does. But this report still largely sees the relationship the other way round, noting (no doubt correctly) that mass atrocity crimes halt development, such as tourism and capital investment.
74
There is, therefore, a significant disparity between civil and political rights and socioeconomic rights in RtP. This disparity is worrying in itself, given the number of people suffering from poverty and RtP's claimed cosmopolitan concern for 'a humanity that cares more, not less, for the suffering in its midst, and a humanity that will do more, and not less, to end it'.
75
It is also worrying because development and security are relatedunderdevelopment and poverty contribute significantly to violence and instability. Kofi Annan highlights the general importance of socio-economic development when commenting that 'a young man with AIDS who cannot read or write and lives on the brink of starvation is not truly free.'
76
Thomas Pogge points to the inability of severely poor citizens to combat corrupt and anti-democratic governments. restitution of those who inadvertently stand in the way of 'development'' are just as important as 'negative' rights (which are the focus of RtP).
78
Fearon and Laitin found that poverty was a key factor contributing to civil war and Suzuki and Krause found that economic development reduced the risk of civil war.
79
RtP's national civil-political focus is in contrast to the General Comments issued by the Committee on Cultural, Economic and Social Rights, which suggest that all states must respect the economic, social and cultural rights of individuals in other countries -this appears to go unnoticed by RtP and its proponents.
80
In RtP terms, a national commitment to good governance and political participation and representative governance is of limited value if, for example, an individual cannot read the ballot papers or is dying of starvation and so unlikely to have an investment in their future.
This means that RtP's commitment to protecting vulnerable individuals from abuses is rather empty without a prior commitment to the socio-economic rights that strengthen the ability of citizens to meaningfully participate in democracy and good governance measures -the highlevel human rights training in prevention is of little use if individuals cannot exercise these rights 'on the ground'. There is strong evidence that development contributes significantly to security and conflict prevention, suggesting that the structural violence of inequality and poverty is prior to outbreaks of military violence.
81
In order to be meaningful, the international community's responsibility to protect, whether in ICISS' terms of prevention or Ki-moon's terms of assistance, should include a genuine commitment to development and poverty alleviation. The idea of the international community's duty to assist states in preventing abuse suggests that the international community's relationship with problem states is currently neutral, being neither a help nor a hindrance. If the blame for these crises lies with the local government, then, in response to a failure at the national level, it is logical that the international community could perceive a need for action in response.
82
A further issue meriting consideration is the degree of responsibility already borne by the international community in contributing to underdevelopment, violence and insecurity. The chapter now links socio-economic issues to the role of the international community in crises, challenging its role as rescuer.
C The role of the international community in insecurity -to the rescue?
In response to Bellamy's description of an international community which shows more concern for death by politics than by economics, this section demonstrates that the international community contributes significantly to 'death by economics'. Because this socio-economic insecurity is related to acts of violence, the international community therefore contributes to much of the violence within the states, which are then perceived to be unwilling or unable to fulfil their responsibility to protect. The idea that rich states contribute to the underdevelopment of poor states is not new. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage fully with development literature, it is at least plausible that rich country development policies are not helping the global poor, with loan conditions that increase inequality and decrease education, welfare and employment, for example, during the 1990s, developed countries reduced their development assistance by 27%. whilst poor countries struggle to obtain affordable generic drugs and crop seeds as a result of the market access conditions imposed upon them by rich countries.
84
Because socio-economic underdevelopment has been shown in section IV B as being linked to violence and conflict, the international community's responsibility for socio-economic injustice means that they have a responsibility for contributing to the violence from which they wish to rescue people.
Two examples demonstrate these points well. In the Balkan crisis, Anne Orford argues that the key threats to peace were viewed to be local historical ethnic tensions; set against the local cause of threats, the question for international actors was that of rescue. 
86
This led to a decrease in income per capita, increased unemployment and attendant social unrest, together with a perception within the various regions that independence would be necessary to be able to reverse the damaging social changes introduced by the central government and the IFIs. reforms and increased centralisation decreed by the IFIs. This is a very different, and more complex, picture than that of purely local factions fighting for local reasons, with the only question for the international community being whether or not it should intervene to protect individuals at risk from local violence.
The problematic role of the international community in intra-state violence can also be demonstrated in Rwanda, where Belgium's colonial policy of elevating Tutsis to senior economic positions at the expense of the Hutu population is said to have led to many of the ethnic tensions that led to the genocide in 1994. Rwanda's exposure to the international market in coffee and the economic problems caused by the collapse in coffee prices is also said to have contributed significantly to the tensions through rapid increases in poverty and resulting social unrest. 89 Far from helping prevent instability and violence, international aid agencies and development programs are also alleged to have contributed to the 'structural violence' of poverty, inequality and humiliation of the local population, which was largely excluded from meaningful participation in decisions (and jobs) in the development process. to prevent violence, or react usefully to it, then it cannot ignore the broader context in which violence occurs or the wider range of actors responsible for violence. Bellamy concurs that focusing on the need for acts of 'intervention' ensures that military interventions are perceived as discrete acts, rather than a different part of the spectrum of the international community's historical, ongoing, long term involvement in 'problem' states.
92
This section has suggested that the international community is a significant contributor to violence taking place in the countries that RtP deems incapable of protecting their citizens.
This calls into question RtP's genuine commitment to root cause prevention as it is merely addressing the symptoms. The result of focusing on symptoms over causes is the perceived importance of military intervention in response to these symptoms -it is to this issue that the chapter now turns. acceptable policy option. The point being made here is that the absence of a genuine commitment to doing everything that can be done, before contemplating military intervention, will mean that any use of force is unlikely to be perceived as legitimate. Doing 'everything'
should not be taken to be diplomacy and sanctions in response to a crisis, but should also include a serious long-term commitment to poverty and inequality reduction as part of the international community's responsibility towards vulnerable individuals. law, any more than its predecessor concept of humanitarian intervention, and the General Assembly's World Summit endorsement of RtP was very limited and only to the extent that the idea was in line with existing international law. 101 The idea that RtP is uncontroversial because it simply reflects existing international law sits uneasily with those aspects of RtP that seek to move beyond the existing legal framework -especially the need for UN Security Council authorisation for military
intervention. An example of this is the thinking of Anne Peters, who admits that the legal status of RtP is not settled, but suggests that if RtP were a legal norm, then Security Council veto action could potentially be illegal and the P5 would be obliged to give reasons for any veto -something which she suggests may, in any event, be an existing procedural obligation.
104
The push for implementation of RtP, now that the 'battle for ideas' is apparently won, 105 Despite its 'contestability', the idea that the RtP doctrine is a necessary and welcome development permeates international legal discourse and relates to the idea that extant international (peace and security) law is not 'fit for purpose' in its ability to meet the security threats of the post-Cold War era. 108 Gillian Triggs argues that generally 'international law is 104 responding dynamically to the contemporary concern for the humanitarian needs of the individual' 109 but is still not able to respond adequately, is still not fit for purpose, because it does not allow military intervention without Security Council authorisation. 110 This idea that international law is not fit for purpose can be seen not just in relation to intervention for 'human protection' purposes, but in other areas of law, including 'cyber war' and terrorism, where a threat is identified as too novel for existing law to be able to respond adequately. 111 In counterpoint to calls to move international law 'forward' to enable a military response in RtP situations, others note that the rules prohibiting use of force exist for good reason and the migration of human rights issues away from multilateral resolution and into the area of peace and security, use of force, is problematic. Philip Alston argues that the focus on ad hoc interventions, in response to civil and political crises, allows the interveners to avoid supporting existing multilateral human rights promotion and protection regimes. 112 Mary
Ellen O'Connell notes that the risk of increasing the range of permissible uses of force is an overall increase in violence and instability. 113 Brazil's concept of 'responsibility while protecting' draws attention to the very high costs of an intervention, in terms of casualties and increased violence, aptly demonstrated in Kosovo when the NATO bombing campaign was said to increase ethnic cleansing during the ensuing chaos.
114
'Fitness for purpose' therefore seems to be synonymous with the expectation that international law should permit military intervention in more situations than it currently does. As noted, this risks increasing the overall level of violence and instability in the world.
In relation to the questions posed by the editors of this volume (to what extent international law can address the types of security threats in the 21st Century and where international law might fall short in this regard), RtP suggests that international law is capable of addressing the security threat of atrocities, but that it currently falls short in doing so, particularly in relation to the authorisation of military force. In contrast with this theme, this chapter has suggested that asking if international law is 'fit for purpose' because it does not permit military intervention to provide security, is asking the wrong question. International law does not necessarily fall short just because it does not mirror the ideas in RtP about when military intervention should occur and how it should be authorised.
VI Conclusion
This chapter outlined the development of the RtP doctrine and examined some problems with
RtP's view of the key threats to individuals and their security in the post-Cold War era. The problems identified were the prioritising of mass atrocity crimes over other suffering and death; the focus on civil and political rights abused by a local government; the assumption that the international community is well-placed to undertake a secondary responsibility to protect by assisting with conflict prevention; and the assumption that a new doctrine is required because existing international law is not capable of responding adequately to the question of intervention without Security Council authorisation. The chapter demonstrated these problems by highlighting an alternative understanding of the source and type of threats to the security of vulnerable individuals. Here the chapter explored the role of the international community in contributing to the insecurity of individuals across the globe, both through chronic socio-economic underdevelopment in general and its role in suppressing national political participation and through more specific examples of international community policies, which contribute to the very crises to which the international community wants to respond. The chapter then suggested that the way RtP views crises (and the role of the national government and international 'community' of states) leads to an assumption that the rules on the use of force need to be revisited, such that military intervention can be undertaken not as a last resort and not requiring Security Council authorisation. Linking this to international law more generally, the chapter examined RtP's relationship with the international legal regime governing peace and security and related this to general debates about the extent to which international law is 'fit for purpose' in addressing contemporary problems.
The central questions of this book relate to the adequacy of international law to respond to contemporary security threats. This chapter has argued that RtP constructs the nature of threats, and so the best response to them, in such a way as to suggest that certain aspects of international law are not capable of responding to the security threat of mass atrocity crimes (chiefly, the strict procedures of the UN in relation to international peace and security). In its attempt to respond to this security threat, RtP addresses some of the symptoms of global insecurity, rather than the fundamental causes. Those who wish to do good in responding to situations of insecurity, and who believe that the international community has a responsibility towards vulnerable individuals across the globe, should therefore refocus their efforts on chronic conditions of poverty and inequality, both because these are important in their own right and because these efforts are likely to reduce the sorts of crises that RtP was designed to address. In relation to the human rights-state sovereignty paradigm involved in RtP, assuming that international law is not fit for purpose because it does not permit military interventions into another state is a flawed assumption. There are good reasons to limit the
